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Marsha S. Atkin, #5246
Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office
451 South 200 East, #125
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-535-77 67
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, a
Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 920478-CA

v.

Priority 2

MAURINE MCGUIRE,
Defendant/Appellant.

Statement of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction for this case is conferred upon the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1953,
as amended).
Statement of Issue
I.

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH AND
SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR TELEPHONE
HARASSMENT.
Standard of Review

The standard of review for a criminal conviction after a bench
trial is set out in State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987),
where

the

Supreme

Court

stated

that

judicial

findings

and

inferences drawn by the trial court are to be given "great weight"
and only rejected if "clearly erroneous".

This Court has further
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explained that "due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witness."

State v.

Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 318 (Utah App. 1987).
Determinative Provisions or Statutes
The determinative statute for this case is Section 11.08.030
of the Salt Lake City Code, which statute is set out fully in the
Addendeum attached hereto.
Statement of Case

,

Defendant/Appellant Maurine McGuire (hereinafter referred to
as defendant) was served with an Information and Summons for
Telephone Harassment in January, 1992. The case was tried before
the Court, the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings presiding. The Court
found

defendant

guilty

on

July

7, 1992, and

defendant was

subsequently sentenced.
Statement of Facts
Appellee concurs with defendant's Statement of Facts with the
following additions.
The witness Mrs. Taylor was asked numerous times during the
course of the trial about the identity of the voice of the person
making the harassing telephone calls.

She continued to respond

that it was the voice of Maurine McGuire, whom she had known for
several years (T. 3, 5, 6, 7 and 9).

In addition, she was able to

state that the voice had a unique distinction of a "kind of
laughter to everything she says" (T. 10).
Mr. Taylor also identified the voice in the telephone calls
that he answered as Maurine McGuire, stating he had spoken to her
2
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on the telephone at least ten times on previous occasions (T. 14,
15 and 16). Mr. Taylor attempted to describe the voice, stating
that "it was a voice you can't forget" and it had a "voice change"
(T. 16).
In addition, a telephone call was made to the Taylor residence
by Lisa Larson pursuant to a request by defendant.

Ms. Larson

testified that defendant told her to say something about "getting
a prosecutor" after Ms. Taylor or that charges would be pressed (T.
19 and 32). She did not recall saying anything about the police
(T. 32). Defendant's testimony was that she asked Ms. Larson to
say "the next time she wants to send the police to someone's door
in the middle of the night that she should be sure she has the
right person" (T. 23).
Summary of Argument
The evidence presented during the trial of this case included
the positive identification of defendant's voice by the witnesses
based on specific qualities and characteristics of defendant's
voice and the witnesses' prior association with defendant.

There

was further direct evidence that defendant made the harassing
telephone calls because she instructed another person to actually
make one of the calls. The Trial Court judged the credibility of
the witnesses and heard the characteristics of defendant's voice
before finding defendant guilty of the offense.
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Argument
I.

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH AND
SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR TELEPHONE
HARASSMENT.

The offense of Telephone Harassment under Salt Lake City Code
Section 11.08,030, as set out in the Addendum attached hereto,
includes repeated, unwanted telephone calls at inconvenient hours
and the use of obscene, profane or threatening language with intent
to terrify, intimidate, harass or annoy. According to Plaintiff's
Exhibit One, also set out in the Addendum attached hereto, and the
testimony

of

the

witnesses,

telephone

calls

started

at

approximately 10:31 p.m., were made within several minutes of each
other and continued into the next two days (T. 1, 3, 4, 6 and 8).
The language used in the calls was obscene, profane and threatening
(See Plaintiff's Exhibit One, T. 4 and 15). The telephone calls
made to the Taylor residence were harassing under the Salt Lake
City Code.
In an old case, State v. Karas, 138 P. 788, 790 (Utah 1913),
the Utah Supreme Court stated that a person's:
(V)oice is a competent means of identification, and one
by such means alone may be sufficiently identified. . .
But the testimony should be reasonably positiv€> and
certain, and based upon some peculiarity of the person's
voice, or upon sufficient previous knowledge by the
witness of the person's voice.
In that case, the witness testified that he thought the voice
belonged to the defendant but was not willing to swear to it in
Court.

There was no evidence that the witness had previously

spoken with the defendant. Karas, 138 P. at 289. The Court found
there was insufficient evidence to uphold the verdict, stating:
4
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Had it been shown that the witness had previous knowledge
of the defendant's voice, and for that reason, or because
of some peculiarity of the voice, was able to tell the
defendant's voice when he heard it, or had he shown such
associations or acquaintances with the defendant as to
fairly presume he had such ability, and then had been
able to testify with a reasonable degree of positiveness
and certainty that the voice he heard was the defendant's
voice, the sufficiency of the evidence as to identity
might be conceded. But nothing of the kind was shown.
Karas, at 791.
In State v. Booker, 709 P. 2d 342 (Utah 1985), the Supreme
Court explained the Karas rule, limiting it to cases where the
voice identification is the sole piece of evidence linking the
defendant to the crime.
identification

However, that Court

alone is considered

stated

"voice

insufficient to support a

conviction unless shown to be especially reliable.

Booker, 709

P.2d at 345.
In State v. Kilpatrick, 173 P.2d 284, 285 (Utah 1946), the
Supreme Court stated that voice identification is sufficient when
the identifier is "familiar with the voice of the person" or the
voice possesses "some peculiar characteristic which could not be
easily mistaken".

In addition, the Court allowed the evidence of

identification to be bolstered by circumstantial evidence.

State

v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 128 (Utah 1986), also indicated that
circumstantial evidence could be used to identify a voice.
The instant case differs from the above cited cases in that
Ms. and Mr. Taylor positively identified the voice of defendant.
When asked several times during the course of the trial, they did
not hesitate to state that it was the voice of defendant, unlike
the witness in the Karas case. Although it is a difficult task to
5
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describe a voice, both witnesses attempted to do so.

Ms. Taylor

stated it had a "laughter" to it and Mr. Taylor stated it was an
unforgettable voice with a "voice change".

In addition, the

witnesses provided reliability of their identification through
their prior conversations with defendant and knowing her for
several years.
The

testimony

of

the witnesses

met

all

prongs

of

the

reliability test set out in Karas and Kilpatrick, namely, the
identification was reasonably positive and certain, it was based on
a peculiarity of the voice and it was based upon previous knowledge
and familiarity of defendant and her voice.
This case did not include any circumstantial evidence linking
defendant to the telephone calls received by Ms. and Mr. Taylor; it
included direct evidence that defendant was willing to harass the
witnesses over the telephone.

Lisa Larson make a call to the

Taylors' answering machine at the direct request of defendant.
During the trial of the case, the Court had the opportunity to
hear the defendant's voice and any peculiarities of that voice.
The Court was able to assess the voice in light of the descriptions
of

the

witnesses

as

having

a

"laughter"

"unforgetable" with a "voice change".

to

it

and

being

At the conclusion of the

trial, the Court specifically stated that he was convinced of the
guilt of defendant beyond a reasonable doubt and that the telephone
calls were made by defendant.

The Court found that the witnesses

had spoken on the phone enough to identify the defendant's voice.
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The Court also found that the call made by Lisa Larson was
close enough in time to be considered as further evidence of
telephone harassment on behalf of defendant (T. 34-35).
The Trial Court not only judged the credibility of the
witnesses in this case, it was able to hear the voice of defendant
in making its determination.

The evidence is sufficient that

defendant made repeated, unwanted telephone calls, using obscene,
profane or threatening language with intent to terrify, intimidate,
harass or annoy.
Conclusion
The verdict in this case was not "clearly erroneous" but based
on adequate evidence supported by facts and a review of the record.
The evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of telephone
harassment.

Appellee respectfully requests that the decision of

the trial court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of January, 1993.

Marsha* S. Atkin
Assistant City Prosecutor
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered four true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to Ms. Leisha M. Lee-Dixon, Salt
Lake Legal Defender's Association, 424 East 500 South, #300, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84111, this 19th day of January, 1993.
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11.08.010

11.08.050

Place of commission of offense
involving use of telephone.

11.08.010 Assault
An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled
with a present ability, to commit a violent injury
on the person of another: It is unlawful for any
person to commit an assault within the limits of
Salt Lake City. (Prior code § 32-1-2)
11.08.020 Battery.
A battery is any wilful and unlawful use of
force or violence upon the person of another. It is
unlawful for any person to commit a battery
within the limits of the city. (Prior code § 32-1-3)
11.08.030 Telephone harassment
A. A person is guilty of telephone harassment
if, with intent to annoy or alarm another, he/she:
1. Makes a telephone call, whether or not a
conversation ensues, without purpose of lawful
communication, including but not limited to
making a call or calls and then terminating the
call before conversation ensues; or
2. Makes repeated, unwanted telephone calls
at extremely inconvenient hours; or
3. Insults, taunts or challenges another by use
of telephone communication in a manner likely
to provoke a violent or disorderly response; or
4. Telephones another and knowingly makes
any false statement concerning injury, death, disfigurement, indecent conduct or criminal conduct of the person telephoned or any member of
his/her family, or uses obscene, profane or
threatening language with intent to terrify,
intimidate, harass or annoy. The making of a
false statement as herein set out shall be prima
facie evidence of intent to terrify, intimidate,
harass or annoy.
B. Telephone harassment is a Gass B misdemeanor: (Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code
§ 32-1-19)

11.08.040 Emergency telephone abuse.
A. A person is guilty of emergency telephone
abuse if such person:
1. Intentionally refuses to yield or surrender
the use of a party line or a public pay telephone to
another person upon being informed that such
telephone is needed to report afireor summon
police, medical or other aid in case of emergency,
unless such telephone is likewise being used for
an emergency call; or
2. Asks for or requests the use of a party line or
a public pay telephone on the pretext that an
emergency exists, knowing that no emergency
exists.
B. Emergency telephone abuse is a Gass B
misdemeanor.
G For the purposes of subsection A of this
section:
1. "Emergency" means a situation in which
property or human life is in jeopardy and the
prompt summoning of aid is essential to the
preservation of human life or property;
2. "Party line" means a subscriber's line or
telephone circuit consisting of two or more main
telephone stations connected therewith, each station with a distinctiveringor telephone number.
(Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code §
32-1-20)
11.08.050

Place of commission of offense
involving use of telephone.
Any offense committed by use of a telephone
as set out in Sections 11.08.030 and 11.08.040, or
their successors, may be deemed to have been
committed at either the place at which the telephone call or calls were made, or at the place
where the telephone call or calls were received.
(Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code §
32-1-22)
Chapter 11J2
OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
Sections:
11.12.010

Riot.
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